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Abstract 
The main aims of the article are as follows: (1) to indicate that cognition (in 
particular the conditions of effectiveness in laboratory practices) may be satis-
factorily  modelled from  a (properly determined)  constructivist  perspective; 
(2) to reconstruct the latest tendencies within science and technology studies 
encapsulated  in  the  term  (post)constructivism  rather  than  in  the  notion  of 
social constructivism; (3) to show how technoscience is conceptualised from 
the (post)constructivist standpoint.  
Key words: science and technology studies/sociology of scientific knowledge, 
(post)constructivism, technoscience, laboratory practices.  
 
Preliminary Remarks—around Constructivism 
The research aims of this article are as follows: 1) to demonstrate that cogni-
tion, including the phenomenon of effectiveness in laboratory research, may 
be  satisfactorily  modelled  from  a  (properly  determined)  constructivist  per-
spective; 2) to reconstruct and amplify the meaning of the latest tendencies in 
science and technology studies encapsulated in the term (post)constructivism 
rather than in the notion of social constructivism (this shift could be especially 
relevant  to  the  context  of  Polish  reception;  3) to  show  how  (post)construc-
tivism conceptualises technoscience. 
                                                             
167 The first version of the article was written with support from a research grant n
o 360-H from 
Nicolaus Copernicus University and published in Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa, 2010, N
o 2: 231-
251. 
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The stance taken in this article should be situated in the framework of con-
structivist reflection on science (including hard sciences) that has been recen-
tly developed and reconstructed in Poland (e.g. Zybertowicz 1995, 1999, Sikora 
2006, Abriszewski 2008, Abriszewski & Afeltowicz 2007, 2009, Bińczyk 2004, 
2010a). The paper is mainly based on Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory, as 
well  as  selected  theses  of  Andrew  Pickering,  Harry  Collins,  Steven  Shapin, 
Karin Knorr-Cetina and Ian Hacking. The conceptions put forward by the afo-
rementioned authors have their roots in science and technology studies, so-
metimes also described as the sociology of scientific knowledge. The studies 
developed from the so-called strong programme in the sociology of scientific 
knowledge of the Edinburgh School in the 1970’s. This interesting research 
area incorporates empirical case studies from the history of science and tech-
nology as well as analyses of contemporary dynamics of scientific controver-
sies  or  processes  involved  in  stabilising  discoveries  and  innovations.  Fur-
thermore, science and technology studies encompass investigating the role of 
particular laboratory and experimental practices, research organization, la-
boratory  equipment,  measuring  instruments,  materials,  samples,  including 
the influence of tacit knowledge and the institutional aspect of scientific rese-
arch.  
In Polish humanities, we can distinguish several separate, characteristic ways 
of  interpreting  or  projecting  constructivism.  Due  to  space  restrictions,  the 
comparison drawn in this article is rather concise and by no means exhau-
stive. Let us not forget, for order’s sake, that alongside constructivism in (la-
boratory)  science  studies,  there  is  also  constructivism  interpreted  as 
a standpoint in sociological theory, a specific view of the society inspired by 
the the classic sociology of knowledge. In the latter case, it is emphasised that 
knowledge  co-produces  social  structure,  while  collective  consciousness  and 
social order both undergo the processes of construction. The Social Construc-
tion of Reality (Berger & Luckmann 1983) written by Peter Berger and Thomas 
Luckmann is one of the key works in this trend. On the other hand, there are 
also constructivist themes in various cognition models inspired by the legacy 
of Immanuel Kant’s epistemology. Such models underline the active role of 
the subject (language, culture, convention) in the process of cognition. The 
object of cognition is not given, but constructed, determined by a priori fac-
tors of different origin that condition the subject. Quite interestingly, one of 
the most recognised and well-developed Polish constructivist standpoints pre-
sented by Andrzej Zybertowicz in his study Przemoc i poznanie. Studium z nie-
klasycznej  socjologii  wiedzy  [Violence  and  cognition.  A  study  in  the  non-
classical sociology of knowledge] (Zybertowicz 1995) unites all three tenden-
cies.  
It would be a mistake to overlook yet another tendency in research that may 
also be adequately described as constructivist. Here, I have in mind the deve-
lopments in communication studies as well as literary studies inspired by the AVANT  Volume IV, Number 1/2013 www.avant.edu.pl 
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radical constructivism of such thinkers as Ernst von Glasersfled, Heinz von 
Foerster, Humbert R. Maturana, Francisco J. Varela or the system theory of 
Niklas Luhmann. I do not feel competent enough to exhaustively describe this 
tendency; for more information please refer to Konstruktywizm w badaniach 
literackich (Kuźma, Madejski & Skrendo 2006, see also Kawczyński 2003)
168. 
* * * 
The point of departure for the present article is that constructivism remains to 
be seen as an attractive and promising proposition. This concerns, in particu-
lar, actor-network theory and the tradition of science and technology studies, 
wherein the efficacy and professionalism of both domains (that is science and 
technology
169) are promisingly elaborated upon. Still, we need to acknowledge 
right at the beginning that the metaphor of construction or constructing, and 
above all social construction, has led its interpreters astray time and time aga-
in (see Hacking 2000: 1-62). Not unlike every other metaphor or category used 
to build up a theory, it has numerous advantages and disadvantages that are 
duly exploited by its proponents. Highlighting particular features of a given 
domain covers others and provokes interpretations that may not have been 
intended by its authors. 
Let us ask then what are the valuable functions of the metaphor in question? 
First of all, we ought to remark that “to construct” means to create and to bu-
ild. Consequently, in constructivism, cognition is usually modelled as a parti-
cular practice, a kind of creative activity. Secondly, the constructivist perspec-
tive provides us with a way to conceptualise cognition as a collective underta-
king.  The  said construction  is  not  performed  single-handedly, but  requires 
cooperation. It is also important to note the difference between constructing 
as a particular process and the construct as a result of this process. For the 
purposes of this article, the process of constructing is of more interest (espe-
                                                             
168 Another publication Konstruktywizm w humanistyce (Kowalski & Pałubicka 2003) should also 
be mentioned; this is, however, a collection of articles on various subjects (e.g. reconstructing the 
conceptions of Ernest Gellner, Samuel Huntington and the question of Martin Heidegger’s con-
structivism). Many of the articles published in the collection, the introduction included (!), do not 
directly concentrate on the issue of constructivism. The authors of the introduction merely note 
that the key problems raised in the publication, i.e. the issues of scientificity of human sciences and 
the condition of philosophy, are placed in the field of “widely understood constructivism”, which is 
in passing defined as “researching the way our thoughts and activities construct the world around 
us”. 
169 In Polish, there are two nearly synonymous terms: “technika” (technique) and “technologia” 
(technology); with regard to these words we can talk about a definitional confusion. Correspon-
dingly, a similar linguistic complication occurs in English. Without engaging in terminological 
debates, let us assume after What Things Do. Philosophical Reflections on Technology, Agency, and 
Design that technique denotes abilities connected with producing and processing artifacts (see 
Verbeek 2005: 3), whereas technology denotes modern inventions, firmly based on scientific di-
scoveries that proliferated in the 19
th century. (Post)constructivism on Technoscience 
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cially in the domains of science and technology) and should be understood as 
building relations, stabilising them, creating links, mobilising resources. This 
view of constructing is interestingly close to the classic sociological notion of 
institutionalisation and implies a gradual undertaking, spread in time. It can, 
therefore, be concluded that nobody constructs in isolation; similarly, there is 
no private institutionalisation of anything
170. 
Finally, the metaphor of construction suggests that what is created, what is 
constructed, cannot be found, given or ready. The results of constructing have 
their history, become visible in various processes and in the end stabilise. The 
constructivist perspective can thus be said to allow for the effects of construc-
ting to be regarded as contingent events (which evidently locates construc-
tivism on antiessentialist positions
171).  
 
Outside Social Constructivism, Starting from the Strong Programme 
The status of scientific knowledge seems to be one of the most crucial que-
stions in the debate between the supporters and the opponents of construc-
tivism. The practical success of technology is often invoked as a significant 
element in the arguments that substantiate the thesis supporting the episte-
mological privileging of science. As it has been indicated by Richard Boyd, 
Hilary Putnam and many others, it would be a “miracle” to build effective 
technologies on the basis of false, uncertain or inadequate theories
172. In my 
opinion,  no  reflection  on  science,  especially  contemporary  science,  should 
ignore its spectacular practical success. I believe that it should be emphasised 
(even more so in the context of Polish reception) that we cannot talk about 
this kind of negligence in the latest research in science and technology studies. 
The research perspectives central to this article, the views of Latour, Hacking, 
Pickering and others, critically invoke the thesis of social construction of reali-
ty
173. Instead of concentrating solely on the institutional dimension of science 
                                                             
170 For this reason the amusing  proposition for a constructivist to deconstruct or to  construct 
slippers under the bed put forward by Elżbieta Kałuszyńska is simply wrongly addressed; see 
reviews of Przemoc i poznanie. Studium z nie-klasycznej socjologii wiedzy (Kałuszyńska 1999). 
171 I call essentialism a philosophical view that assumes the existence and the cognitibility of es-
sential features, i.e. objective, given, unchangeable, belonging to the nature of things. These featu-
res constitute the essence of a given object. In anti-essentialism, the essence of things is seen as 
historical, accidental, contigently stablised and as such these, from the traditional point of view, 
are no longer essences. Essentialism is often accompanied by ontological substantialism, while 
anti-essentialism  by  ontological  relativism.  I  have  written  on  this  subject  before  (see  Bińczyk 
2007: 47-57). 
172 Putnam, quoting Boyd, writes: “[t]he positive argument is as follows: realism is the only philo-
sophy that does not make the success of science a miracle” (Putnam 1975: 73; see also Grobler 
2006: 265). 
173 See the special edition of “Science Technology & Innovation Studies” entitled What Comes after 
Constructivism in Science and Technology Studies? (Meister et al. 2006). It should be noted that AVANT  Volume IV, Number 1/2013 www.avant.edu.pl 
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and technology, their conceptions seem to be characterised by a strong em-
phasis on the laboratory, practical, instrumental and experimental dimension 
of science, seen as a collective enterprise. The originality of the views herein 
presented is predicated on the attempts to model laboratory practices as si-
multaneously: 1) situated materially, guaranteeing effectiveness; 2) empirical-
ly underdetermined (which implies rejecting the bold epistemological claims 
of representationism); 3) institutionalised according to standards and criteria 
that are historically contingent (which, in turn, implies dismissing the funda-
mental assumptions of essentialism). Those conceptions retain particular rea-
listic intuitions I discuss below.  
Even the strong programme in the sociology of knowledge put forward by 
David  Bloor and  Barry  Barnes  should  not  be  interpreted  one-sidedly  — as 
a form of social constructivism, sociological reductionism or relativism main-
taining that the subcultures of scientists “created separate worlds for themse-
lves”, as it has been articulated in Polish commentaries (see for example Gro-
bler 2006: 275, Grudka 2003: 79-80). The standpoint of the Edinburgh School 
has its origins in the concern for methodological correctness in the studies of 
cognition, science and their historical and social conditioning. The principles 
of the strong programme constituted the foundations of interesting empirical 
research.  As  I  have  pointed  out  beforehand,  the  standpoint  of  Barnes and 
Bloor is 1) naturalistic, 2) scientistic and 3) materialistic at its core (see Biń-
czyk 2010b). Let us give some consideration to these three elements.  
As  it  is  emphasised  by  its  commentators  and  proponents,  the  strong  pro-
gramme offers a “naturalistic” reconstruction of beliefs (including scientific 
ones) (Nola 2008: 263-266; Barnes, Bloor & Henry 1996: 3, 173, 182]. Natura-
lism in this context signifies presenting explanations that come from empiri-
cal sciences (psychology, sociology, biological and cognitive sciences). When 
describing the phenomenon of human knowledge (including hard sciences, 
mathematics and logic), the British sociologists systematically avoid referring 
to  normative,  philosophical  concepts,  such  as  truthfulness  and  rationality. 
Furthermore,  the  proponents  of  the  strong  programme  in  the  sociology  of 
knowledge perceive their undertaking as a strictly scientific analysis of scien-
ce itself. Bloor goes as far to dub his approach scientism and emphases the 
fact that the criteria of scientificity are always methodological. Scientificity is 
marked  by  compliance  with  particular  procedures,  standards,  rules  or,  in 
other words, norms (Bloor 1991: 160). Methodological accuracy is guided by 
rules of conducting correct research, which in each field are already given 
and widely acknowledged. Similarly to all other rules of human activity, met-
hodological norms are steeped in history and this is the only kind of norms we 
may have.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Latour and Woolgar deleted the adjective “social” from later editions of their book Laboratory 
Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts (Latour & Woolgar 1979). (Post)constructivism on Technoscience 
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The ideas of the Edinburgh School can also be described as materialist or rea-
listic.  The  co-proponents  of  the  strong  programme  describe  themselves  as 
fierce opponents of methodological idealism, a view that ignores the role of 
nature in the process of cognition. To them, the basis of knowledge is a causal 
relation  between  the  cognizant  subject  and  their  environment.  In  other 
words, they presume the existence of “a non-verbal causative factor” in hu-
man knowledge
174. The influence of nature on our knowledge is nevertheless 
empirically underdeteremined; it cannot be specified with certainty, owing to 
the underdetermination of scientific theory by evidence described below. 
 
A Banalised Version of Realism 
We can ascribe a certain form of trivial realism to the conceptions discussed 
in the paper
175. It would mean assuming that human cognition (and activity) is 
taking place in a certain environment. A similar solution is put forward by 
Ludwik Fleck, a Polish microbiologist and researcher of science, associated 
with  the  tradition  of  the  sociology  of  scientific  knowledge.  He  states  that 
“[d]ue to grammatical constrains, I (only) use the word >>reality<< as a neces-
sary grammar element of the sentences on the act of cognition” (Fleck 1986: 
198). The standpoints discussed in this article simply assume the existence of 
an environment as a certain potentiality, within which construction is taking 
place. 
Such banal realism is accompanied by distinct a-representationalism, a view 
which assumes that the properties of reality cannot be unambiguously repre-
sented or defined independently of human activities, procedures or cognitive 
decisions. The project of representationalism is rejected as too ambitious epi-
stemologically.  A-representationalism  rejects  the  following  assumptions  1) 
human knowledge adequately represents reality; 2) there is only one relation 
of  adequate  representation;  3)  achieving  an  adequate  representation  of 
knowledge to reality explains the practical success of science and technology. 
A-representationalism does not signify abandoning a rather weak thesis that 
in our cognitive activities, and also in research practice, we strive to build 
models. The primary function of model building is to simulate chosen aspects 
of our surroundings. Manipulating models of given phenomena makes it po-
ssible to develop valuable theoretical and practical solutions that guarantee 
the repetitiveness of results. In science, we continuously endeavour to find 
connections between various elements, such as a tissue sample, test result, 
chemical  reaction  and  illness.  Those  connections  are  called  “networks  of 
                                                             
174 In  other words, “>> reality<< is simply a vast and complicated sequence of non-verbalised 
information that we divide into groups” (Barnes & Bloor 1993: 107). 
175 I discuss banalised realism, underdetermination of laboratory practice and technoscience in 
two other papers (Bińczyk 2010, 2010a). AVANT  Volume IV, Number 1/2013 www.avant.edu.pl 
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translation” or “networks of reference” in the actor-network theory of Bruno 
Latour; however, he assumes that building “chains of reference” is weaker 
than in many other traditional epistemological views. Latour rejects the very 
assumption that there exists an ontological “gap” between the world and its 
representation (he simply proposes to ignore the problem of representation). 
Instead,  actor-network  theory  reconstructs  the  practices  of  model  building 
and “chains of circulating reference” in laboratories. Those practices encom-
pass numerous attempts to create and to sustain the whole network of scatte-
red relations between actual elements of different kind (see Latour 1999: 24-
79, Bińczyk 2007: 223-233, Abriszewski & Afeltowicz 2007, 2009). For instance, 
when assessing the growth of the Amazonian jungle in relation to the Brazi-
lian savanna that would be maps, marked trees, soil samples, colour indica-
tors, a box for comparing samples (pedocomparator), tables, drawings, chemi-
cal tests, the final scientific publication. In other research that could be che-
mical  substances,  indicators  on  measuring  instruments,  diagrams  etc.  Ele-
ments that model particular dependencies are connected in research practice; 
however, among  those  elements  we cannot find pure  Nature,  nor unambi-
guous and final Adequate Representation.  
 
Underdetermination of … Laboratory Practice 
In  order  to  explain  the  sources  of  a-representationalism,  I  refer  to  a  well-
known Duhem-Quine’s thesis on the underdetermination of scientific theory 
by evidence. There are numerous controversies that surround the interpreta-
tion of particular motives in the philosophy of Pierre Duhem and Willard Van 
Orman Quine and different views on the fact whether the ideas of those philo-
sophers  of  science  contain  assumptions  of  similar  meaning  at  all  (see  e.g. 
Ariew 1984, Rzepiński 2006, 2006a)
176. Let us, however, try to avoid (at least 
some) oblique statements and assume that from now we refer to the thesis on 
the problem of unambiguous localisation of a falsified element. Duhem wrote: 
 
                                                             
176 Duhem-Quine’s thesis quickly started to circulate in commentaries in a simplified version that 
synthesised two different claims. The first concerns separability, the second is a consequence of 
the first one and concerns falsification (Quinn 1969; Ariew 1984: 314 passim). The claim of sepa-
rability holds that a physicist cannot test experimentally a completely isolated hypothesis. The 
claim of falsification holds that when falsification occurs a physicist is not able to unambiguously 
localise the falsified element.  
In Quine’s formulation, every scientific statement may be held true, as long as we accordingly 
reshape other areas of our knowledge (Ariew 1984: 315). In turn, according to Tomasz Rzepiński, 
the thesis on the underdetermination of theory by facts has two versions that concern: 1)  the 
underdetermination of the falsification procedure 2) the underdetermination of the choice be-
tween empirically equivalent theories, namely the theories that have the same class of observa-
tional consequences (Rzepiński 2006: 285, see also Rzepiński 2006a). Only the underdetermination 
of the falsification procedure is of concern for the present paper. (Post)constructivism on Technoscience 
 
324 
 
the physicist can never subject an isolated hypothesis to the experi-
mental test, but only a whole group of hypotheses; when the experi-
ment is in disagreement with his predictions, what he learns is that at 
least one of the hypotheses constituting this group is unacceptable and 
ought to be modified, but the experiment does not designate which one 
should be changed (Duhem 1991: 187). 
In other words, the Duhem-Quine’s thesis in the quoted version suggests that 
the falsity of an observational (categorical) sentence should not be seen as 
a conclusive proof of falsity of the hypothesis, as it only invalidates a conjunc-
tion of many sentences. To refute a conjunction, we do not need to renounce 
the hypothesis; we can invalidate one of its component sentences. The impo-
ssibility  of  conducting  unambiguous  falsification  procedures  inclines  us  to 
conclude  that  theories  are  underdetermined  by  empirical  evidence.  In  the 
words of Grobler:  
any finite set of data gives rise to an infinite number of alternative hy-
potheses (Grobler 2006: 59).  
The undertermination thesis was accepted as a result of the difficulty with 
unambiguous specification of the properties of reality. Specifying the features 
of the world always takes place in the context of human assumptions, catego-
risations or results from our own manipulations and interventions. Nature in 
itself does not have the supreme authority in disputes; human efforts are al-
ways  necessary  to  articulate  nature,  e.g.  in  an  experimental  situation.  An 
unambiguous interpretation of any experiment results entails enclosing any 
controversy in the community of researchers, redefining up-to-date views and 
stabilising relations. An unambiguous interpretation of any experimental re-
sults demands that controversies in the community of researchers must be 
closed,  previous  solutions  must  be  redefined,  and  many  relations  must  be 
stabilised anew. As Latour writes: 
As long as controversies are rife, Nature is never used as the final arbi-
ter since no one knows what she is and says (Latour 1987: 97) 
Not every person is authorised to speak in the name of nature itself (referring 
to “pure facts” or “laws of nature”), as this requires taking up the position of 
a nature spokesman or simply an expert.  
The  phenomenon  of  underdetermination  in  science  takes  on  the  shape  of 
a certain potentiality:  it allows a possibility  that any  finite  set  of  empirical 
data could be potentially compatible with a number of alternative hypotheses 
(the category of infinity would be too much here — more than one hypothesis 
is enough). This possibility undermines the claim that our knowledge adequa-AVANT  Volume IV, Number 1/2013 www.avant.edu.pl 
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tely represents reality
177. Let us, however, remark that history and current 
scientific practice illustrate that, in fact, apart from periods of heated con-
troversies, not many alternatives are in fact built, as there is hardly any mo-
tivation  to  do  so.  Alternative  theories  or  research  programmes  are  often 
abandoned, for example, due to the high cost of their implementation. There-
fore, it seems that the processes in which alternatives are rejected seem to be 
one of the most interesting phenomena to analyse in science and technology 
studies.  
According to Hacking, analysing the underdetermination of theory by eviden-
ce in the form presented so far engenders a serious problem, as it is far too 
specific! The underdetermination of theory by evidence refers exclusively to 
the logical and the theoretical dimension of science. However, one cannot fail 
to see that in any actual problematic situation or in any case of falsification, 
scientists struggle with the difficulty of underdetermination not only on the 
theoretical level: they may modify the theory, redesign their laboratory equi-
pment, change its parametres or alter the interpretation of experimental data 
(Hacking 2000: 71-74). This “resistance” within the scientific practice may take 
on different forms; for instance, laboratory procedures in use or the impossi-
bility of redesigning the equipment may limit the results or force delivering 
particular ones. A similar pressure may be exerted by the unavailability of 
funds or the power of silently accepted methodological or philosophical pre-
mises
178. It can be concluded that the whole scientific practice is underdeter-
mined, not only its theoretical level.  
Hacking, in his argumentation, refers to the category of robust fit obtained in 
laboratory practice. This notion is introduced by Pickering in The Mangle of 
Practice  (Pickering  1995)  and  describes  elements  that  have  their  origin  in 
many different layers: practice, theory, experiment, instruments, calibration 
(physical constants). As Pickering asserts, scientists, while trying to work out 
                                                             
177 Since humans have no other way to localise the facts (in the cognitive as well as in the practical 
dimension) than in the context of their own claims, ideas, cognitive schemes and materially situa-
ted procedures or practices, it means that epistemological conditioning always determines our 
ontologies. In consequence, a thesis that we construct our beliefs with regard to what is seen as 
objective reality in a given community may be interpreted as an ontological thesis that we con-
struct the so-called facts. This conclusion might have been avoided, if we could unambiguously 
separate epistemological and ontological dimensions. Owing to a visible lack of success in this 
matter, science and technology studies scholars suggest rejecting the very division between onto-
logical and epistemological questions (the latter cannot be answered anyway, as this lies outside 
our research procedures and cognitive frameworks). 
178 A very good example from bacteriology is provided by Fleck who shows that the rule of species 
unchangeability forced particular theoretical results. It was perceived as the “resistance” of reali-
ty, whereas it was an artifact of the method. Microorganisms were not bred long enough (e.i. 
more than 24 hours) to observe species variability, as a result such variability was not considered 
at all (Fleck 1986: 124–126, see also Bińczyk 2009). (Post)constructivism on Technoscience 
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those elements, negotiate and renegotiate everything on every layer. Hacking 
sums it up: 
The fit between theory, phenomenology
179, schematic model, and ap-
paratus is robust when attempts to replicate an experiment go pretty 
smoothly” [Hacking 2000: 72]  
Still, the “fitting” obtained as a result of laboratory efforts is never the only 
one possible (Hacking 2000: 95); therefore, it is not possible to retain the cate-
gory of adequate representation of theory to reality.  
While Latour supports realistic realism (Latour 1999), Pickering is in favour of 
realism  in  its  banalised  version  that  implies  the  existence  of  material  “re-
sistance” of reality. Still, the author of The Mangle of Practice emphasises that 
“the resistance of matter” in laboratory practice never determines (as an iso-
lated factor) the final form of scientific facts or technological artifacts. The 
phenomenon  of  “resistance”  in  research  practice  is  also  underdetermined. 
Laboratory practice is a potentially open process without any a priori, definite 
results and it should not be seen as teleological or essentialist, since it is a pro-
cess that involves shifting research aims, transforming hypotheses, and devel-
oping skills of researchers. Pickering substitutes the notion of representation 
with categories of adaptation, adjustability or “interactive stabilization” in its 
material, technical, conceptual and social dimensions
180. 
 
Why (Post)constructivism? 
Introducing (post)constructivism, a rather complicated term, may seem un-
necessary to many readers, since as (it was indicated) the conceptions men-
tioned in the article can be included in the constructivist research on cogni-
tion. I, however, deem this idea useful for a number of reasons. Firstly, this 
approach makes it possible to contrast the reconstruction of science and tech-
nology studies herein presented with the current tendencies in the Polish hu-
manities to locate these studies (and the strong programme in the sociology of 
knowledge) within social constructivism and sociological reductionism. Asso-
ciating the views enumerated in the present paper with sociological reduc-
tionism is inaccurate, even more so after considering the latest achievements 
of science and technology studies as well as the evolution of actor-network 
theory. Secondly, this term should call attention to the specificity of the dis-
cussed views that conceptualise science above all in its practical, laboratory 
dimension, accounting for its material, instrumental conditioning. Thirdly, the 
                                                             
179 For Hacking “phenomenology” is an interpretation of empirical data. 
180 As there is no space for further analysis, let us merely remark that a similar model of laborato-
ry practice was built by Knorr-Cetina, the co-creator of the ethnography of laboratory (Knorr-
Cetina 1983, 1995). AVANT  Volume IV, Number 1/2013 www.avant.edu.pl 
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approaches presented should be deemed (post)constructivist, because of the 
theses they include: retaining realistic intuitions, accounting for the discussed 
above ambiguity of laboratory practice as well as exploring the issue of tech-
noscience and its practical success
181. 
In the latest developments in science and technology studies, constructing is 
not considered an exclusively social undertaking. The processes of construct-
ing are rather multi-dimensional phenomena that also take place in the “ma-
terial”  dimension.  Generally  speaking,  the  adjective  “social”  may  be  safely 
omitted while talking about constructing. The examples of constructed objects 
may  include  radios,  clocks,  theories,  political  programmes,  the  ozone  hole, 
frozen embryos, data banks, anthrax bacterium or viruses such as HIV (see 
Latour  1993:  49-50).  Only  after  arduous  processes  of  constructing  is  there 
a chance to assess to which ontological domain a given object belongs: de-
pending whether it turns out to be a natural fact, a social norm, a fiction, an 
idea or a set of ideas. 
Usually a given, constructed object is constituted by a whole network of inter-
connected and ontologically diverse elements. These are not only social rela-
tions, but also factors described as natural/material (non-human), normative, 
organizational and symbolic that are joined and stabilised in gradual process-
es of objectifying facts. In the case of the ozone hole, there can be chemical 
research, legal acts, political actions, decisions made by ordinary people while 
shopping, refrigerators, deodorants, new assembly lines and ideas of future 
generations’ rights. In the case of clocks, apart from material objects called 
clocks,  factories  and  repair  shops,  we can  talk about complex  networks  of 
connections of normative and symbolic character: legal acts that introduce the 
division into time zones, conventions of using clocks, agreements on measur-
ing  time,  organization  of  practices  according  to  time,  specific  socialization 
rules etc. In the case of anthrax bacterium, described by Latour in his work 
The Pasteurization of France, the appearance of a new bacterium as an objec-
tive fact of nature is identical with modifying the sprawling spheres in which 
a collective functions
182: organization of breeding farms, the politics of farm-
ers, the interests of civilians, scientific institutions, mental habits and every-
day customs of ordinary people were altered as a result of introducing the 
practices of hygiene (see Latour 1988). 
                                                             
181 The term “postconstructivism” is also present in Western commentaries, especially with refer-
ence to actor-network theory (see e.g. Asdal 2003, Meister 2006). 
182 I use the term collective present in Latour’s actor-network theory. The collective is more than a 
society, as it incorporates the dynamics of connecting people with non-human factors whose role 
should also be accounted for according to the French scholar. Nonhumans, meaning artifacts and 
wider technological systems as well as elements traditionally described as material or natural, 
have co-created and co-create the parameters of the world we live in. (Post)constructivism on Technoscience 
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The results of such constructing efforts may have different levels of objectivity 
and  may  even  be  disassembled;  for  example,  by  questioning  a  fact  that  is 
problematised as a result of controversy. This process could be illustrated by 
the example of phlogiston, ether or coloricum in physics and chemistry. The 
effects of construction processes are often considered real and obtain the sta-
tus of unproblematic objectivity in consequence of stabilising particular rela-
tions or ending controversies. Nowadays, this seems to be the fate of the DNA 
chain, the HIV virus or the mad cow disease. Being subject to the process of 
construction does not necessarily mean that a given object is a fiction or an 
artifact that can be easily deconstructed. The costs of deconstructing or desta-
bilising a given network of connections between many elements that found 
a particular fact are very often enormous (and depend on the extent of con-
nections). 
Of course, the constructing efforts are limited by important restrictions, such 
as previous, already stabilised constructions, standardised practices and in-
terventions made beforehand. New solutions, both cognitive (facts) and prac-
tical (artifacts) usually have to be compatible with those already present. It 
seems important to follow the history of discoveries and innovations intro-
duced in a collective by analysing the said specific process of rejecting alterna-
tives,  namely  the  cases  of  ignoring  particular  solutions.  The  impression  of 
cumulativeness,  purposefulness  and  necessity  in  the  history  of  science  (or 
technology) is amplified as a result of “erasing” our knowledge of alternative 
propositions that have not been accepted. When we fail to consider rejected 
solutions (theoretical as well as practical), we also fail to see the contingent 
character of human history. Automatically accepted essentialist assumptions 
often constitute an improbably effective cognitive blockade in this context. 
From the essentialist perspective, the practical and theoretical views accepted 
by the collective are the only possible and true ones, as these are “consistent 
with” the essential properties of reality itself (with its structure increasingly 
better described by science). 
It is then no surprise that the works such as Pickering’s Constructing Quarks. 
A  Sociological  History  of  Particle  Physics (Pickering  1984)  are fiercely criti-
cised. We find it hard to accept a thesis that undermines the universal status 
of contemporary theoretical physics. In other words, we have difficulty ac-
cepting the possibility of physics without, for instance, the theory of quarks. 
However,  in  accordance  with  the  presented  version  of  constructivism  that 
rejects  essentialist  assumptions,  such  a  possibility  should  not  be  excluded. 
Still, we should remember that physics without the theory of quarks would 
require many previous, perhaps difficult to imagine, alternative solutions, in 
the history of science and technology as well as in the history of the whole 
collective.  AVANT  Volume IV, Number 1/2013 www.avant.edu.pl 
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Latour puts forward a rather surprising thesis that the objects that surround 
us, such as radios, political programmes, viruses and bacteria are both real 
and  fabricated  or  constructed.  This  thesis  underlies  the  originality  of 
(post)constructivism. We easily accept that technological innovations, such as 
radios and cars, are constructed, whereas a thesis that facts of nature are fab-
ricated or construed is almost always defied. According to the French sociolo-
gist, bacteria are real for a collective, because they have been constructed by 
demonstrating their autonomy in laboratory practice, that is to say they have 
been made available to the humankind due to laboratory manipulations, in-
terventions and actions. Furthermore, bacteria are real, as they put up re-
sistance in laboratory by interacting with other elements in a non-free way. 
The properties of objects constructed in laboratory practice are not entirely 
pliable
183.  
(Post)constructivism does not support a complete freedom of construction, but 
merely concludes that bacteria had been “beyond the reach” of humankind 
(both cognitively and in the practical aspect of “coping” with them), before 
they were put in the sphere of human praxis
184. Before this happened, bacte-
ria had constituted a sphere of undomesticated potentiality about which we 
could not have had any reliable knowledge (we could only have had meta-
physical beliefs). (Post)constructivism refrains from making unjustified claims 
and  avoids  deciding  on  the  ontological  status  of bacteria  before  they  were 
domesticated by the collective.  
From the (post)constructivist standpoint, all beings incorporated in the collec-
tive have a history of their creation and proliferation; this observation con-
cerns not only ideas or artifacts, but also such objects as atoms, bacteria or 
ether. Nonhumans, also known as the facts of nature, are also the results of 
complex efforts of gradual recognition and practical “coping with” them. The 
objectivity and the properties they have from our point of view (and this is the 
only one we have) are the effects of experimenting, closing controversies and 
institutionalization. Ascribing (essentialist) properties to particular objects of 
nature is a historically accidental process, full of dramatic twists and turns; 
therefore, it seems that preserving the category of essence in its traditional 
understanding seems unjustified from this point of view. 
 
 
 
                                                             
183 An unambiguous localisation of those properties outside our present research procedures and 
theorethical frameworks seems to be impossible, as it is consequent upon the underdetermina-
tion of laboratory practice.  
184 Present in the conception of Karol Marx, the category of praxis describes a historically situated 
practice, a set of actions supported and motivated by theoretical reflection.  (Post)constructivism on Technoscience 
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(Post)constructivism on “Technoscience” 
Science  and  technology  are  similarly  defined  in  (post)constructivism  —  as 
institutionalised collective practices — designed for effectiveness and efficacy, 
dependable on the organizational and material infrastructure of laboratory. 
Practically  speaking,  for  the  proponents  of  science  and  technology  studies, 
there are no major differences between the laboratory practices of scientists 
and engineers. In both fields it is essential to increase the level of predictabil-
ity and control (of phenomena). When trying to solve growing theoretical and 
practical problems, scientists are struggling to repeat experiments (what con-
stitutes an important criterion of success in empirical research), whereas en-
gineers are trying to build functioning artifacts. The homogeneous notion of 
technoscience has been introduced to describe both of the above-mentioned 
spheres, e.g. by Latour in his book Science in Action (Latour 1987; see also Ihde 
& Selinger 2003). 
Many of us reasonably resist treating the intellectual work of scientist as equal 
to the activities of engineers and technicians in laboratories. In the philosophy 
of science, and in a general outlook on life, science is mainly associated with a 
selfless “purely” theoretical cognition — a fundamental domain wherein hu-
man rationality is made manifest (e.g. Heller 2009: 13). The representatives of 
sociology of scientific knowledge, however, emphasise that it is debatable to 
concentrate solely on the theoretical or the intellectual dimension while ana-
lysing the phenomenon of science (and in particular contemporary science). 
Theorising, supposed to determine the specificity of science (in opposition to 
technology associated with the practice of tinkering and the implementation 
of intellectual achievements in a machine), plays a lesser role than expected 
and is an altogether different process. As it can be seen in the history of sci-
ence and technology, the practice of tinkering (and random experimentation) 
often precedes theory. Many a time repeated practical results have been ob-
tained without understanding the laws or mechanisms that underlie them. 
Moreover, the role of rational discoveries of a singular, talented researcher is 
rather small and the philosophical attempts to find universal algorithms of 
a rational science have proven unsuccessful. Understanding the phenomenon 
of abstract thinking requires giving attention to the real context surrounding 
the subject: the way it is embodied or socially and materially situated. Hence 
in contemporary science studies theorising is conceptualised as a specific kind 
of situated practices: designing, articulating, ascribing, validating, expanding 
and comparing models that are integrated in experimental systems (see Meis-
ter et al. 2006: 89-90). 
As it is demonstrated by Latour in his article “Give me a Laboratory and I will 
Raise the World”, the practical success of technoscience is based on using the 
specific infrastructure of laboratory (Latour 2009). Thanks to enclosed, isolat-
ed laboratory circuits, the complexity of phenomena may be reduced, taken AVANT  Volume IV, Number 1/2013 www.avant.edu.pl 
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out of their context, sterilised, miniaturised, purified etc. In laboratories, an 
immensely useful and key task is performed — attempts may be repeated, 
errors may be committed and their cost minimised; therefore, it is usually 
possible to find the best solutions by experimenting. Scientists in laboratories 
also stabilise and capitalise their achievements in the apparatuses they design, 
the instruments they use, the procedures they implement and the innovations 
they generate. They also go into a lot of effort to standardise measures and 
criteria that underlie their future success. 
From  the  perspective  of  (post)constructivism,  non-human  factors  such  as 
equipment, measuring instruments, prototypes are an inseparable element of 
technoscience.  Nonhumans  are  understood  as  stabilised  and  encased 
achievements of previous practices that are of crucial importance in under-
standing the conditions of success underlying laboratory sciences. Such fac-
tors facilitate the process of standardization (e.g. in the case of procedures 
and practical solutions), increase the precision of technoscience and generate 
entirely new, broader cognitive competences. 
Of course, intellectual work is an important aspect of doing science; it encap-
sulates  defining  problems,  analysing  terms,  observing  particular  relations 
between different ideas, finding logical relations between the consequences of 
hypotheses.  However,  by  focusing  exclusively  on  theorising  or  on  finished 
theories, we tend to analyse only some of the processes present in science or 
rather only the results of this broad collective enterprise. The material, cogni-
tive and social aspects of science are merged in laboratories that make the 
practical success of technoscience possible (see Griere & Moffatt 2003: 308). 
The latest developments in cognitive sciences oblige us to significantly alter 
the  traditional  ideas  of  what  we  call  “purely”  theoretical  thinking.  For  in-
stance, enactivism (see Lakoff & Johnson 1999) or the concepts of distributed 
cognition
185 suggest that it is a mistake to separate theorising and practical 
tinkering. Defining scientific cognition as the sphere of articulated and ration-
alised  formal  operations  was  already  too  narrow  for  Micheal  Polanyi  who 
introduced the notion of tacit knowledge. In laboratories, the embodiment of 
a subject is crucial in the cases when scientific instruments or tools are incor-
porated by the mind into the representation of their user’s bodily schema. In 
this way the operations or sequences of their use are integrated into body 
coordination structures, such as those used while driving a car, working with 
an electron microscope or an accelerator.  
                                                             
185 For more information on distributed cognition in science and technology studies please refer to 
the article “Cognition: Where the Cognitive and the Social Merge” (Giere & Moffatt 2003). Among 
other classic texts on the subject there are a collection of articles Parallel Distributed Processing: 
Explorations  in  the  Microstructure  of  Cognition  (McClelland  et  al.  1986)  and  a  book  by  Edwin 
Hutchins, an ethnographer, who describes the phenomena of distributed cognition in ship naviga-
tion systems (Hutchins 1995). Similar theses on the importance of “delegating” cognitive compe-
tences onto the environment are formulated by Latour (e.g. Latour 1986, 1987). (Post)constructivism on Technoscience 
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Abstract thinking remains inevitably limited without the ability to specifically 
“delegate” competences and cognitive processes to objects and their surround-
ings. As, for example, in making complicated calculations with a sheet of pa-
per, an abacus or a set of coordinates or building a model of the DNA struc-
ture with coloured wires and balls. The processes of “extending” or “external-
ising” the mind into the environment are facilitated by broad cultural systems 
and information technologies, such as writing, drawings, tables, graphs, regis-
ters or maps, so that we can produce cognitive results of superior quality. Due 
to such innovations, we can observe relations, compare results and prepare 
more precise and longer argumentation. Complex conceptual work, mathe-
matical or chemical calculations, are often made “outside” the mind of the 
researcher,  using  digital  visualizations,  building  models,  prototypes  of  ma-
chines or measuring instruments etc. (Giere & Moffat 2003: 303; Latour 1986). 
Quite importantly, the only stable and lasting results are those that we have 
learned to “externalise” into the surroundings. Such mechanisms of “external-
ization” are widely employed in technoscience, whose history is, in fact, the 
history  of  innovations aimed  to  externalise cognitive  functions  (see  Latour 
1986: 22). 
Nowadays, “pure” theorising is performed in basic science, but its importance 
wanes in the times dominated by commercialization processes. In contempo-
rary society, science enters the post-academic phase characterised by inter-
disciplinarity, a variety of actors and institutions engaged in research, and 
a pressure to market scientific achievements in the short run (Bucchi 2004: 
134). More and more researchers are behaving like businessmen and venture 
capitalism determines research programmes (Bucchi 2004: 134), especially in 
the domains such as nanotechnology, biotechnology and microelectronics. As 
Massimiano Bucchi writes: 
[i]t is calculated that around 64 per cent of research world-wide is fi-
nanced by companies and that almost 70 per cent of it is performed by 
the companies themselves  (Bucchi 2004: 135). 
The category of technoscience echoes the diminishing role of basic research as 
well as the processes of identifying research programmes with business ven-
tures. 
 
Instead of Conclusion: Further Inspirations 
From the historical moment when the laboratory, a place of systematic exper-
imentation, was invented, it proved to be an excellent tool for effective prob-
lem  solution  and  capitalising  scientific  achievements.  At  the  moment,  as 
a result  of  the  fusion  of science and technology with  industry,  innovations 
generated in laboratories appear to “colonise” the collective instantly, largely 
thanks  to  market  mechanisms.  This  incessant  information  exchange  com-AVANT  Volume IV, Number 1/2013 www.avant.edu.pl 
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bined with the processes of globalization and cultural acceleration shape the 
dynamics of constant change in the parameters of collective life. We can ob-
serve a growing complexity, an extensiveness of relations between heteroge-
neous elements, along with other interesting phenomena: a radical transfor-
mation of the status of expert knowledge, a proliferation of scientific contro-
versies, political fights for the position of defining risk. Sociologists who diag-
nose  the  condition  of  contemporary  society,  such  as  Ulrich  Beck,  Anthony 
Giddens, Zygmunt Bauman, Immanuel Wallerstein, and Bruno Latour, tend to 
write about the unwanted side-effects of modernity, new forms of risk, con-
nected with science and technology in this context (see Bińczyk 2006). They 
point  to new  domains  of systemic risk  that  may  jeopardise  the  stability  of 
a collective as a whole: ecological risk, stock market and job market risk, use 
of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and epidemiological danger.  
Scientific and technological interventions often have surprising consequences 
in areas located far away from their introduction. Sometimes such interven-
tions may destabilise legal and economic structures, change social bonds or 
generate  unknown  ethical  dilemmas.  Philosophical  positions  that  support 
traditional essentialism have difficulty with modelling the current range of 
medical and genetic interventions, the development of biotechnologies and 
the level of change in the ecosystems or even in the cosmic space. After all, the 
essentialist standpoint assumes the existence of a finished and complete reali-
ty that can be described with the use of ontologically unambiguous categories 
of nature and society, nature and culture, objects and humans, values and 
facts.  
At this stage in the development of technoscience, there is every reason to ask 
whether our environment plays the role of unpolluted Nature, a stable back-
ground for human activity, or whether it is an artifact of our production: 
the life of a blade of grass in the Bavarian Forest ultimately comes to 
depend on the making and keeping of international agreements (Beck 
1992: 23) 
and Giddens adds: 
[w]e cannot talk about such a thing as nature, because the entire world 
has been changed by human technology (Giddens 2006: 3, trans. by 
M.W.). 
It seems that, due to the level of its current transformation, nature may be 
described as a human construct in a trivial sense
186.  
                                                             
186 Let us give two examples: the DDT pesticide accumulating in penguins living in the Antarctic 
and Mount Everest also known as the highest waste dump in the world with around fifty tones of 
rubbish. (Post)constructivism on Technoscience 
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The hybrid nature of objects introduced in the sphere of collective life by la-
boratories appears to justify the shift from the essentialist views. Let us take, 
for example, genetically modified tomatoes with jellyfish genes that glow un-
der special light when the plants do not have enough water. Another type of 
genetically modified tomatoes with fish genes, the „Flavr-Savr” tomatoes, are 
more resistant to transportation in cold conditions (Klaasen 2007: 104-105). 
We need to ask ourselves the question how we should classify this type of be-
ings. 
Still another example is the practice of patenting organisms; the US Supreme 
Court allowed the first patent on a living organism
187in 1980. The patent was 
issued for a bacterium from the pseudomonas genus designed to dissolve car-
bohydrates and in this way degrade oil spills. A bacterium with five thousand 
own genes and one added to its genome (around 0.02% change) in accordance 
with the court’s logic became a humanmade “product”, a design (see Krimsky 
2003: 64). As a result of this decision, first the oncomouse was patented in 
1988, then hemocytoblasts (bone marrow cells) of human foetus in 2001. 
Our cognitive habits, public institutions and political procedures should be 
adequately equipped for the interventions made in laboratories, and in order 
to  do  this  we  should  situate  our  thinking  beyond  essentialism. At  present, 
(post)constructivism appears to be a suitable point of departure, as it is a good 
tool to model the already mentioned phenomena connected with the contem-
porary  dynamics  of  technoscience.  Through  conceptualising  cognition  as 
a collective practice, (post)constructivism does not allow for a separation of 
science  and  technology  from  their  integral  socio-political  context.  Further-
more,  it  focuses  on  science  itself  and  explores  conditions  conducive  to  its 
practical success, without reducing this domain to a set of theories and logical 
problems.  By  providing  non-normative  reconstructions  of  contemporary 
technoscientific  institutions,  science  and  technology studies  offer  a starting 
point for a reflection on the role of both domains in the contemporary world.  
The constructivist perspective developed in this article allows for questioning 
the Enlightenment axiom of scientific independence and innocence. Further-
more, a proper reevaluation of scientific potential should be conducted with-
out  falling  prey  to  the  hysteria  of  antiscientism  or  technophobia.  As 
Zybertowicz writes: 
                                                             
187 The US Patent Office was established in 1790; it issues a patent to “[w]hoever invents or di-
scovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement thereof” (35 U.S.C. 101 in: Krimsky 2003: 59). AVANT  Volume IV, Number 1/2013 www.avant.edu.pl 
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it should be an element of  ethics in science to reject the assumption 
that knowledge, if verifiable, intersubjective etc., is an unproblematic 
good (Zybertowicz 2003: 101)
188.  
Likewise, Andrzej Szahaj adds that  
the  paradigm  of  axiological  neutrality  of  science  shows  too  many 
anomalies (Szahaj 2007: 160). 
Let us hope that challenging at least some assumptions of this paradigm will 
initiate a reliable reflection on the political role of technoscience in the global 
society which, in turn, will give us a chance to openly discuss the scope of un-
wanted consequences of our own making.  
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